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IN T'HE SUPREME COURT 
Q~F T'HE STATE OF UTAH 
LEARA ANN DEVEREAUX, 
Plaintiff a.nd Appellant, 
-vs.-
GENERAL ELECTRIC 
COl\IP ANY, a corporation, 
and HAROLD J. McKEEVER, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 8472 
Petition for Rehearing 
Come now the defendants and respondents and re-
spectfully petition the Court for a rehearing of the above 
case and of the decision made and filed December 10, 
1956; and state and allege that the Court has erred in the 
following particulars : 
1. The majority opinion mentions and considers 
only the negligent failure of plaintiff to look or if she 
did look her negligent failure to see what was there to 
be seen. No consideration appears to have been given 
by the majority opinion to the U-turn made by plaintiff 
and appellant in complete violation of Sec. 41-6-67, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. 
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2. The majority opinion contains inconsistent legal 
conclusions. 
3. The majority opinion disregards a long line of 
decisions by this Court and in effect reverses these de-
cisions only by implication, thus clouding well established 
precedents. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT1. NEGLIGENT U-TURN IN 
VIOLATION OF SECTION 41-6-67, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF ACCIDENT. 
From the uncontroverted facts in this case as recited 
by the majority opinion, plaintiff and appellant was 
negligent in two respects, not just one. First, she was 
negligent in not looking, or if she did look, in failing to 
see what was there to be seen. This negligence was ad-
mitted by the majority opinion, but it was held that this 
failure to see was not necessarily as a matter of law the 
proximate cause of the accident. But what of the other 
negligence of plaintiff and appellant'? What about mak-
ing a U-turn 'Yithin 500 feet of the crest of a hill "There 
the turning vehicle could not be seen b3~ a car approach-
ing from the same direction until such car had topped the 
crest f This is an independent act of negligence "~hich is 
not related to plaintiff's failure to see. To illustrate the 
point let us take an example. .L.\_ssume '' .. A.'~ makes a 
U -turn on a straight and level high"~ay- vrhere there are 
no obstructions to Yisibility. ''A~' fails to observe 
on-coming traffic and is struck by ''B.'' There "~as noth-
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ing illegal or improper about the place where "A" 
attempted to make the U -turn. ''A'' 's negligence was 
his failure to maintain a proper lookout and his turning 
when on-coming traffic created a hazard. 
Now assume "A" made aU-turn within 400 feet of 
the crest of a hill and from which point there was no visi-
bility back over the crest. Assume ''A'' fails to observe 
traffic before starting the U -turn. Assume "A" is struck 
by a car traveling in the same direction as ''A.'' Now 
"A" is clearly negligent as a matter of law in two re-
spects: (1) Failure to maintain a lookout, and (2) making 
aU-turn in a place where it is illegal to do so. 
The precise and only reason that our statute forbids 
a U-turn near the crest of a grade when the turnin·g 
vehicle cannot be seen by an approaching car within 500 
feet is to prevent an accident such as is involved in this 
ease. A turn made in violation of this statute is a negli-
gent turn as a matter· of. law. Furthermore, such an 
illegal and negligent turn must have been a contributing 
proximate cause of this particular accident. Whether 
plaintiff sa\v or even looked for other cars is far less a 
contributing factor to this accident than the choice of the 
place where she did attempt her illegal and negligent 
c·-tu rn. The record viewed in the most favorable light 
from plaintiff-appellant's viewpoint clearly establishes 
that there was no visibility from the place of impact over 
the crest of the hill ( R. 37), and that the U-turn was 
attempted at a point not over 400 feet from the crest 
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(R. 60). Plaintiff-appellant attempted her U-turn in a 
place which the law recognized to be dangerous and haz-
ardous and therefore absolutely prohibited. Are we now 
to say that motorists may violate this absolute prohibi-
tion and then if an accident occurs demand the right to 
submit their case to a jury~ Proximate cause as well as 
negligence must be found as a matter of law and not be 
left to conjecture by a jury. 
The majority opinion recites that "the jury could 
reasonably find that she (plaintiff-appellant) used due 
care in starting to make the turn as she did.'' The ma-
jority opinion also recites, "for even though she (plain-
tiff-appellant) had observed all of the existing condi-
tions she was not necessarily negligent in proceeding into 
the highway as she did.'' (Italics added) \\ e submit the 
error of these conclusions. Under Utah Statute no I.--turn 
could legally be made by anyone, including the officer, at 
the particular place involved. An illegal turn is not and 
ca.nnot be a turn made 'Yith ''due care,'' and ''not neces-
sarily negligent.'' 
We conclude, therefore, that the majority opinion 
must of necessity haYe been considering only the negli-
gent failure of plaintiff appellant to look or if she did 
look her negligent failure to see "~hat "~as there to be 
seen. ..At no point does the majority opinion appear to 
have considered the independent negligent action of 
attempting a lT-turn at a place "~here it 'vas forbidden. 
This illegal act must be held to be a contributing proxi-
mate cause of the accident "~hich resulted. 
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POINT II. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
CONTAINS INCONSISTENT LEGAL CON-
CLUSIONS. 
The majority opinion states ''Appellant's failure to 
see the stopped cars undoubtedly was negligence.'' Also, 
"So she either did not look or failed to observe what 
\Yas there to be seen before she entered the highway to 
make the U-turn and in that respect she was negligent as 
a matter of la\v.'' 
In spite of these two categorical conclusions by the 
majority opinion that plaintiff was guilty of negligence 
as a matter of law, we find two statements which are 
completely inconsistent therewith. These two inconsistent 
statements are: "The jury could reasonably find that she 
used due care in starting to make the turn as she did,'' 
and ''she was not necessarily negligent in proceeding into 
the highway as she did.'' 
Are the trial courts of Utah to be left with these 
inconsistent conclusions to confuse them in trying future 
automobile collision cases~ We hope not. 
POINT III. THE REVERSAL, BY IMPLI-
CATION ONLY, OF A WELL ESTABLISHED 
LINE OF DECISIONS CLOUDS THE PRECE-
DENTS OF THIS COURT. 
This Court in Cederlof v. 1Vhited, 110 Utah 45, 169 
Pac. 2d 777; Mingus v. Olson, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. 2d 
495; Cox v. Thompson, ______ Utah ______ , 254 Pac. 2d 1047, and 
Benson v. D. & R. G. vV. Ry., 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 Pac. 2d 
790, denied recovery because the injured party was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In each of 
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these cases the contributory negligence consistent of fail-
ure to maintain a proper lookout or of failure to see what 
was there to be seen. In one of the above cases/ in addi-
tion to this failure to see what was there to be seen, the 
plaintiff was also walking across a busy highway at a 
place where no cross walk was· marked. While it was not 
illegal for plaintiff to cross at such a point, the statute did 
provide that the pedestrian was bound to yield the right 
of way to a vehicle upon the road. This court held that 
''If decedent had yielded the right of way to defendant's 
automobile or if he had looked up the road and seen the 
approaching car and paid heed to the danger which it 
presented, the accident would never have happened. It is 
patent that the negligence of the decedent was a substan-
tial factor in bringing about his death." 
In the case now before this court the plaintiff-appel-
lant made an illegal and absolutely prohibited U-turn in 
addition to failing to see \vhat ''as there for her to see. 
If the majority opinion stands, confusion and uncertainty 
will result \vi.th respect to the la\v established by the 
foregoing cases. 
The majority opinion cites as precedent decisions 
three Utah cases, Con1bs Y. Perry, :J l;tah 2d 381, 275 
Pac. 2d 680; Lo1Dder Y. Holley, 1"20 Utah 231, 283 Pac. 2d 
350; Bates v. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, "281 Pac. 2d 209. In 
all three of these cases the plaintiff ,,~as the favored party 
with the right of \Yny. In each case plaintiff \vas legally 
at the place of impact and defendant ""as clearly Yiolatiug 
h<tsic statutes of our State. In all thr(~e cases this Court 
1Cox v. Tho.n1·pson, supra. 
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further found that even if plaintiff had looked and seen 
'vhat was there to be seen that each of the plaintiffs could 
have proceeded as they did without necessarily being 
negligent because of their favored position and because of 
their right to assume that the defendants would yield the 
right of way. None of these same propositions apply in 
favor of this plaintiff in the case now being argued. Plain-
tiff had no right of vvay, she was illegally turning within 
the 500 foot danger area from the crest of a hill, and she 
failed to maintain a proper lookout. Not one of the con-
trolling factors are here present which prompted this 
Court to permit the issue of contributory negligence to 
go to the jury in the three cases cited by the majority. 
We close by referring the Court to the excellent and 
compelling logic of the dissenting opinion. We submit 
that this opinion argues this case for us in a most logical 
and convincing manner. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM, 
Attorneys for RespDndents 
307 Utah Oil Building, 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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